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Abstract—Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) remove traditional
assumptions of end-to-end connectivity, extending network
communication to intermittently connected mobile, ad-hoc, and
vehicular environments. This work considers anonymity as a vital
security primitive for viable military and civilian DTNs. DTNs
present new and unique anonymity challenges since we must
protect physical location information as mobile nodes with limited
topology knowledge naturally mix. We develop a novel Threshold
Pivot Scheme (TPS) for DTNs to address these challenges and
provide resistance to traffic analysis, source anonymity, and
sender-receiver unlinkability. Reply techniques adapted from
mix-nets allow for anonymous DTN communication, while secret
sharing provides a configurable level of anonymity that enables
a balance between security and efficiency. We evaluate TPS
via simulation on real-world DTN scenarios to understand its
feasibility, performance, and overhead while comparing the
provided anonymity against an analytically optimal model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern network communication paradigms often assume
end-to-end connectivity. While this assumption holds for en-
vironments such as the Internet, military and civilian examples
of challenged networks abound. Disconnected rural commu-
nications, “pocket switched networks” [20], mobile, first-
responder, vehicular, and ad-hoc networks are all instances
of non-traditional challenged networking environments char-
acterized by unreliable resources and intermittent connectivity.
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) [3] attempt to provide net-
working in these challenged environments. DTNs store-and-
forward data to provide eventual delivery if a contemporaneous
end-to-end network path does not exist. While current research
addresses DTN routing and naming problems [3], [9], less un-
derstood are the unique security issues inherent to DTNs [10].
This work explores adding anonymity and privacy to DTNs.
DTNs are well-suited to an ad-hoc deployment of nodes,
such as a military distribution of troops in occupied regions.
In military contexts, security and anonymity are mandatory.
Battlefield warfare depends on a resistance to traffic analy-
sis to prevent communication from leaking information, and
covert military operations and intelligence gathering require
the ability to remain anonymous. Anonymity also plays an
increasingly important role within non-military engagements
including e-governance, citizen journalism, social networking,
law enforcement operations, “whistleblowing,” telemedicine,
vehicular networks, and disaster response scenarios.
* Work performed while authors were part of BBN Technologies’ Internet-
working Research.
DTNs present unique challenges to designing a secure
and efficient anonymous DTN system. Since nodes are often
disconnected and opportunistically use links as they become
available, traditional approaches to anonymity [4], [7] are not
directly applicable to DTNs. The disconnected and dynamic
nature of DTN links due to node mobility both constrains and
increases the complexity of system design.
Design challenges are accompanied by a new potential for
adversarial attacks. An adversary has an advantage in inferring
the source of a message when the network topology reduces
the size of the anonymity set or prevents traffic mixing.
Therefore, DTN anonymity must not only protect the identity
of communicating nodes, but also their physical location in
the network. It is non-trivial to develop a system that prevents
an adversary from linking communicating nodes or deducing
their network location.
We overcome these challenges and develop the Threshold
Pivot Scheme (TPS) as a step toward identity and location
anonymity in DTNs. Our contributions include:
1) TPS, a system to balance user-specified anonymity re-
quirements versus efficiency in DTNs
2) An analytic framework to help understand ideal
anonymity guarantees in a mobile and dynamic DTN
3) Qualitative overhead and anonymity comparison of TPS
to DTN-naı¨ve schemes and analytic models
While TPS is a work in progress and makes assumptions
about the ability to pre-distribute public keys and identities1,
our hope is to advance the state of practical DTN anonymity.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditional approaches to anonymity rely on the concept
of mixing [4]. In mix networks, messages are sent along a
chain of proxy nodes, called mixes, each of which accumulate
and forward source-encrypted messages in batches. Batching
messages and layered decryption prevents the correlation of
mix inputs with mix outputs while sending a message along a
chain of mixes requires only a single honest mix to ensure the
message source cannot be linked with its destination. Provably
secure mix message formats have been developed to facilitate
an anonymous response to an unknown source using reply
blocks [5], [6], [24], but the disconnected nature of DTNs pre-
cludes the pseudonym management required by these schemes.
1Such distribution is assumed in many military contexts.
In Tor [7], the most popular deployed mix network, mixing
is achieved by layer-encrypting a message at the source and
decrypting once at each hop of a source-selected circuit of
proxy relays. The last relay sends the unencrypted message
to the destination specified by the client. Unfortunately, this
source-based routing approach becomes extremely inefficient
in DTNs since an opportunistic path to the destination cannot
be pre-computed. Anonymity and privacy schemes for ad-hoc
networks [2], [17], [22], [25], [31] are similarly incompatible
with DTNs since they either employ source-routing or assume
a fully connected, available, and reliable network.
Specific to rural DTNs, Kate et al. [14] created a complete
anonymous rural area system using Identity Based Encryption
(IBE). Their resulting scheme increases efficiency and reduces
the role of the IBE-required Private Key Generator (PKG).
Anonymity is achieved using existing pseudonymous tech-
niques that replace real identities with dynamically generated
pseudonyms [13]. However, their system still requires periodic
updates from the PKG and relies on the existence of trusted
gateways and kiosks to function. Anonymity is thus strictly
dependent on these trusted entities, each of which represents
a point of failure.
Our TPS approach most closely resembles the Cashmere
system, the result of recent research in leveraging Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) overlays [32]. Cashmere specifies a set of
groups for relaying messages and assumes reachable nodes in
the overlay capable of responding for each group. In contrast,
DTN nodes have no a priori information on which nodes are
reachable, or when particular nodes will become reachable.
TPS therefore augments many of the notions introduced in
Cashmere by permitting any encountered groups to serve as a
sequence of relays while providing a per-message configurable
level of anonymity.
III. SECURITY MODEL
This section details our security model as well as assump-
tions over the adversaries against whom we defend.
Identity Anonymity: A subject is anonymous if its identity, or
other personally identifiable information, is unknown with ab-
solute certainty [19]. In practice, a subject’s anonymity is rela-
tive to other indistinguishable subjects in the same system. All
such subjects form the anonymity set. With only two members
in the anonymity set, an adversary should have no greater than
a 0.5 chance of assigning an identity. The degree of anonymity
therefore depends on anonymity set size and probability of
de-anonymizing a subject. A message source has sender
anonymity if it cannot be distinguished from other senders in
the system: receiver anonymity is analogous. Deployed sys-
tems often achieve anonymity through unlinkability—sender-
receiver pairs cannot be linked as communication partners.
Location Anonymity: Physical location anonymity is a partic-
ular concern in DTNs. Their very nature implies that a node
may be connected only to a small set of other nodes at any
given instant and that the total size and geographic reach of the
DTN is small. In such environments, traffic analysis attacks
are especially effective as the ability to identify the relative
location of a source equates to revealing that source’s identity.
Whereas Internet-wide anonymity systems can attempt to
enforce spatial diversity [28], location anonymity is far more
difficult in DTNs.
Adversary: We define our adversary as a local-global adver-
sary in the sense that not only can it control a single DTN
node, it also has the ability to passively monitor all commu-
nication in the network. Anonymity systems are vulnerable
to numerous types of attacks [8], [11], [12], [29]. While we
assume the adversary is capable of launching such attacks
against our system, we note that traffic analysis remains an
open problem for currently deployed anonymity networks [11],
[18]. Note that Denial-of-Service attacks are out-of-scope for
this work since a DTN adversary may prevent communication
by trivially dropping packets at the point of attack.
Key Management: Although key management is a well-known
open problem in DTNs, our system will require that a node has
access to other nodes’ keys. In connected networks, an online
trusted Certificate Authority is contacted to verify the authen-
ticity of public keys and validate certificates. DTNs require
a unique approach to key management because there is no
online entity to which every node is continuously connected.2
Henceforth, we assume a DTN deployment of n > 0
nodes, N = {N1, N2, . . . , Ni, . . . , Nn}. For simplicity and
clarity of presentation, we assume each node Ni maintains a
public/private key-pair (PKi, SKi) and has immediate access
to all other node’s public keys, i.e. PKj∀j 6= i. However, we
note that any offline or DTN key management scheme, such
as [14], may replace this approach to establish the required
keys between nodes.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
Not only do common approaches to anonymity fail in
DTNs, many adaptations of existing systems are inefficient
or impractical. Therefore, a central theme of our system is
to provide a practical and configurable level of anonymity to
balance security and efficiency in challenged environments.
We briefly describe some naı¨ve DTN anonymity schemes and
why we reject them in order to better understand the Threshold
Pivot Scheme (TPS).
A. Naı¨ve Strategies
Epidemic: The canonical DTN forwarding mechanism, “epi-
demic” routing [30], provides a natural form of anonymity.
DTN messages, called bundles [21], are single copy flooded to
connected DTN components. Simple anonymity is seemingly
provided by epidemically disseminating an encrypted message
with a spoofed source address and broadcast destination ad-
dress. Assume Alice (A) wishes to send the cleartext3 msg
anonymously to Bob (B). The bundle is:
2In many military and commercial contexts, pre-placing keys and identities
is feasible.
3Random values may be added to seal and prevent replay: we omit such
details in our discussion for sake of exposition.
β = (msg|RK)PKB
where (·)k is encryption with key k.
Each node receiving the bundle will attempt to decrypt the
message using its private key to determine whether it is the
intended recipient. Any node able to decrypt is implicitly the
destination. Return traffic uses the return key RK so that B
can reply without knowing the true identity of A:
βreply = (msg′)RK
Epidemic anonymity leverages existing DTN routing proto-
cols and is simple to implement. The true source of the mes-
sage is difficult to differentiate from intermediary forwarding
nodes. However, despite its simplicity, anonymity based on
epidemic flooding is inefficient and impractical for all but the
smallest networks.
Random Pivot: A second simple scheme introduces a single
indirection pivot to provide source anonymity and sender-
receiver unlinkability. The source A chooses a pivot node p
at random and constructs an encrypted bundle:
β = ((msg)PKB |B)PKp
Once β reaches p, it is decrypted and is pivoted towards the
destination B. To provide two-way communication, a similar
approach is used with additional information included in A’s
message. The source message will additionally contain another
pivot node, p2, and A’s address encrypted for p2. A fresh
symmetric return key is included so that B can encrypt a









B forwards a reply to p2, passing along A’s encrypted address
in the response. Finally, p2 will decrypt A’s address and relay
the reply to A. B’s reply becomes:
βreply = (msg′)RK | (A)PKp2
Unlinkability is maintained: the destination B is unable to
discern the bundle source A.
Random pivot is attractive in that the pivot selection is
independent of its physical location. The pivot learns no infor-
mation about the location of the source, and the pivot location
leaks no information to the destination. However, pivoting
is inefficient in practice. Delays associated with finding and
routing to the random pivot node causes unacceptably low
message delivery ratios (see §V).
Adapting Tor: Consider applying Tor [7] and other onion rout-
ing protocols directly to DTNs. While feasible, this approach
is analogous to selecting three random pivots as above since
nodes do not know the current state of the dynamic DTN
topology. A direct adaptation of Tor is at least as inefficent as
the random pivot scheme and therefore similarly impractical.
Group Onions: Consider assigning each DTN node to a group
and routing on a “group onion.” Instead of requiring a bundle
to pass through a pre-specified in-order sequence of nodes,
the message passes through nodes belonging to a sequence of
groups. However, the order in which groups are encountered
is still unknown a priori, and presupposing a particular group
encounter order is impractical. Allowing for any encounter
order is similarly impractical since it requires a number of
permutations that is factorial in the number of groups.
B. Threshold Pivot Scheme
TPS improves upon the aforementioned naı¨ve strategies
with the intuition of group onions while improving efficiency.
Let G = {G1, G2, . . . , Gg} be a set of g anonymity groups,
where 1 ≤ g ≤ n. Each group Gj contains a set of nodes.
Each node Ni belongs to at least one group: ∀i ∃j Ni ∈
Gj . Each group Gj ∈ G is assigned a public/private key-
pair (GPKj , GSKj). The assignment of nodes to groups is
an important but separable problem which our future research
considers. In describing and evaluating TPS, we reasonably
assume a random distribution of nodes to groups. In military
environments, this process would be akin to pre-placing keys,
for instance by assigning various troops or regiments to groups
prior to deployment.
Public/Private Keys: Each node Ni maintains a keychain of
the following keys:
• A public/private keypair (PKi, SKi) and a copy of every
other node’s public key PKj∀j 6= i
• (GPKj ∀Gj ∈ G): the public key of every group
• (GSKj ∀j Ni ∈ Gj): the private key of groups to which
Ni belongs
A node has the necessary group public keys to encrypt
messages for other groups, and the necessary group private
keys to decrypt messages for groups of which it is a part.
Secret Sharing: Secret sharing is an established method for
distributing trust, i.e. the ability to decrypt among a config-
urable number of participants. We use secret sharing as a
means to accommodate the common case of unknown DTN
topology or communication paths. Shamir [23] defines a (τ, s)
threshold secret sharing scheme in which a secret κ is divided
into s shares S1, S2, . . . , Sτ , . . . , Ss for 1 ≤ τ ≤ s. Knowl-
edge of any τ shares allows the secret κ to be reconstructed,
while knowledge of at most τ−1 shares reveals no information
on κ. Shamir’s scheme is ideal in that the size of each share
does not exceed the size of κ. TPS leverages secret sharing to
allow a dynamic routing path without incurring the overhead
of group permutations.
Anonymous Messages: Alice wishes to send msg to Bob
(herein abbreviated A and B). TPS uses secret sharing to
divide up a key such that the message must go through a
configurable number of groups. For each transmission to Bob,
Alice generates a one-time (τ, s) threshold secret:
κx = S1, . . . , Ss
For ease of exposition, assume s = g. Let pi(i) be a bijection
to an element in the random permutation of 1, . . . , s. From the
shared secret, Alice creates a group shared secret that encrypts
each share on a group-wise basis:
Fig. 1. Threshold Pivot Scheme. Nodes and group membership are repre-
sented by shapes. Lines represent logical hops through the DTN. The message
source is null, and the destination is only revealed at the pivot node, after being
routed through a user-specified τ threshold of s unique groups.
GSSx = (S1)GPKpi(1) |f1| . . . | (Ss)GPKpi(s) |fs
Alice encrypts msg with Bob’s public key and seals both
the message and Bob’s address with κx. The final standards-







Decoding and Routing: As shown above, group shared secrets
include auxiliary information f for each group-wise encrypted
share. This permits a node belonging to a particular group to
determine which of Sj it can decrypt and whether those shares
have been previously decrypted by another node of the same
group. The auxiliary information:
fj = (Rj |dj)GPKj |j
includes a fixed-length string of random bits Rj , and an
indicator bit dj ∈ {0, 1} denoting whether Sj has been
processed and decrypted.
The auxiliary information does not reveal the total number
of decrypted shares carried by the bundle, but only provides
information on that node’s group share. The Rj bits randomize
fj so that an adversary cannot guess the indicator bit and infer
the number of decrypted shares (where path length approxi-
mates distance from source). Note that we do not prevent an
active adversary from inserting bogus shares and flags4.
As bundle β travels through the network, each node Ni
will check fj for all j such that Ni ∈ Gj . If Ni can decrypt a
share (Sj), on the basis of dj , it decrypts the contents in-
place. Otherwise the node forwards β opportunistically, or
takes advantage of more intelligent routing protocols, e.g. [16],
to increase group coverage as a function of time. For small






of Sj and either correctly reconstruct κx, 5 or know that not
enough decoded shares exist (but not the number of decrypted
shares). For large values of s and τ , we can limit overhead
by using the error-correcting algorithm from Ar et al. [1] to
4Active malicious behavior can be limited by employing group-level
integrity signatures and by providing byzantine tolerance via multiple group
decodings: such protection is beyond our immediate scope.
5A correct reconstruction can be recognized by including a fixed bit-string
alongside the destination address.
reconstruct the Shamir secret polynomial. Once β has passed
through τ unique groups, the pivot node can reconstruct κx
from GSSx, recover B’s address, and route the msg sealed
for B (see Figure 1).
Anonymous Replies: For forward message anonymity, we
require only κx. However to permit anonymous replies from B
to A, Alice must generate an additional shared secret κy and
a one-time symmetric key, Kz . As demonstrated in [5], Alice
facilitates replies by including a reply block in her message:
rbA = (A)κy |GSSy|Kz
Alice’s bundle then includes the reply block and msg sealed







Upon receiving the sealed message and reply block, Bob
decrypts both with his private key. He forms his reply bundle
by encrypting his reply data with Kz . Bob then appends the
remaining parts of rbA to form and route the reply bundle:
βreply = (reply)Kz | (A)κy |GSSy
Thus, Bob can reply to Alice without learning her identity.
We note that, although not presented, TPS requires that each
node in the path uses El Gamal encryption to randomize the
message and auxiliary information, and a polynomial without a
zero coefficient to randomize each share. These randomization
techniques are required to prevent tagging and correlation
attacks. In other words, every hop needs to re-encrypt the
message so the GSSx value changes at every hop, not only
when a share is decrypted. Otherwise the adversary can tag a
message, and can gain information if he sees the same message
with some bytes modified.
V. EVALUATION
As our highest-level goal in TPS is to ensure practical
DTN anonymity, this section seeks to understand the real-
world feasibility of TPS in comparison to what is theoretically
optimal. We describe metrics, experiments, and results from
TPS simulations in various DTN scenarios.
Analysis: §III divides anonymity along identity and location.
TPS conceals identity information by encrypting messages.
The pivot should neither learn nor reveal information about
the physical location of the source, even if the identity
information itself is protected. For example, if the pivot node
can reliably determine it is located within two network hops
of the source, it can deduce the approximate location of the
source and break anonymity.
We can improve geographic indistinguishability by reducing
each group to a single node and selecting required groups that
can reconstruct κ at random. However, this involves a trade-
off between efficiency and security: the more nodes a bundle
is forced through, the longer it requires to be delivered but
the less likely it will leak information about the location of
the source. Notably, the sender of the bundle can choose the
number of groups the bundle must pass through by adjusting
Fig. 2. Comparison of DTN routing strategies. Our TPS scheme uses a threshold equal to the group size of 2, 6, 10, and 14 nodes. All
experiments use first-contact routing unless otherwise noted. (a) Message delivery ratio is the number of messages delivered over the number
sent. In “first-contact” routing in the ONE simulator and an upper bound for TPS configurations. The inefficient “Epidemic” routing has
high delivery rate and is shown for comparison. (b) TPS anonymous to normal message delivery time ratio. (c) Distances between pivot and
source: “sq. line” optimally allows no probabilistic advantage in guessing the source.
the threshold parameter τ . For maximum efficiency, τ = 1: the
threshold for maximum security is dependent on network con-
figuration and group assignment. We note that since maximum
security is achieved when a message has been uniformly mixed
among nodes, there is a threshold beyond which increasing τ
will have no effect on security and only increase overhead.
Individual nodes and networks can select τ values to suit their
desired security and performance requirements.
The importance of the relative location of the source and
pivot can be captured via a “square line picking” [26] opti-
mal distance metric which models a distribution of distances
between any two randomly chosen points on a unit square.
Ideally, the node that reconstructs the shared secret (the pivot
node) should be equivalent to a uniformly sampled node in
the network. Uniformly sampled nodes have no probabilistic
advantage in guessing the location of the source. We compare
the distances between nodes achieved by methods in §IV to
this optimal distance metric.
We use the ONE discrete event simulator [15] to understand
TPS. Our experiments vary the assignment of nodes to groups
randomly and place nodes at random locations. We used the
default world size of 4500 by 3400 meters. Each node has a
transmit range of 200 meters and a movement rate of 0.5-1.5
m/s. Our prototype does not perform any cryptography and
each node is given an infinite storage buffer so we can focus
on protocol performance. Routing in all experiments selects
the first node contacted as the next hop – except for epidemic
which broadcasts bundles and provides a naı¨ve baseline. We
use both random waypoint and map-based movement models
(using the default map from the ONE simulator), but present
only random waypoint as the results are not quantitatively
different. In each experiment, a single message with random
(and valid) source and destination addresses is generated every
25-35 seconds. Each experiment lasts 12 simulated hours and
is run 10 times with different random seeds. We report the
mean results with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Discussion: We show our experimental measurements of mes-
sage transfer times, delivery ratios, and overhead to quantify
the effect of anonymity on these metrics. The ONE simulator
is enhanced to allow for the inclusion of anonymous messages
and transfer as described in §IV.
The message delivery ratio — the ratio of messages de-
livered to those sent — allows us to determine the effect of
anonymity on delivery capabilities. As we expect, Figure 2a
shows a decreasing delivery ratio as the number of groups
increases, since it takes longer to find all nodes required
to decrypt and route the message to the destination. As the
number of nodes in the system increases, the delivery ratio
also increases. Since the number of messages created in each
experiment is held constant, increasing the number of nodes
per group improves message flow and the ability to find nodes
for the required groups. However, the random pivot scheme
does not realize the same improvement since its group size
is constant (one node per group). Figure 2a indicates that
larger networks and smaller threshold parameters allow TPS
nodes to approach the upper bound for delivery ratio — our
(2, 2) threshold anonymity scheme performs nearly identically
to non-anonymous routing. Note that messages that have not
been delivered when the simulation ends are counted as failed,
reducing the delivery ratio.
Figure 2b shows message delivery time overhead induced by
anonymity mechanisms in TPS. We measure overhead by run-
ning TPS and normal (non-anonymous) routing experiments
with identical configuration and recording the differences in
delivery times. We show the results as the ratio of TPS to
normal message delivery time, noting that we only compute
delivery ratios for those messages that are actually delivered
in both cases. Anonymous TPS messages take slightly longer
to be delivered and we again see an improvement in the
ability to find a member of each group with a denser network,
producing lower overhead measurements since it is easier
to find a member of each group. However, random pivot
does not follow the pattern since it is more difficult to find a
particular node at random as the network size increases.
Figure 2c compares the distance between the pivot node and
source to the optimal square line picking distance distribution
for the 250 node experiment. We find that higher threshold
experiments achieve closer to our analytic optimal – pivot
nodes’ locations reveal less information about the source’s
relative location. Note that “square line picking” marks the
practically optimal distances, due to random node placement,
allowed by the simulation.
To summarize our results, we find that the highest threshold
value we simulated, the (14,14) configuration, yields the
strongest location anonymity but the highest overhead and
lowest delivery ratio. Performance, in terms of delivery ratio
and overhead, improve as the threshold decreases, but this also
leads to weaker location anonymity: the (2,2) configuration
provides the weakest degree of anonymity but performs the
best. We do not suggest a TPS configuration that works
in all networks since the correct configuration depends on
the deployed network’s conditions and goals, and the user’s
desired level of security and performance for each message.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We described some desirable properties and military mo-
tivations for DTN anonymity systems and presented a novel
threshold-based approach to anonymous communication for
DTNs. We measured delivery ratio, overhead, and distance and
compared our anonymous scheme to non-anonymous routing.
One area for future work involves the assignment nodes
to groups. This assignment will be vital for preventing in-
formation leakage since it determines how far a message
must travel until it becomes fully decrypted. We also wish
to further explore the use of smarter routing strategies since
our experiments currently use first contact routing to avoid
disrupting analysis by introducing too many variables during
experimentation.
Finally, there are several potential enhancements that we
wish to include in our system. In particular, several anonymous
packet formats for Mixnets [6], [24] may be non-trivially
adaptable to a DTN context, but would strengthen our security
guarantees. Other enhancements include node authentication
without the need for a trusted third party, redundant transfers to
reduce the probability that an adversary can destroy a message
of which it has accepted custody, and pairwise cover traffic
between a pair of connected nodes to frustrate an attacker’s
ability to discover real messages sent through the network by
simply observing the system.
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